

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**DISCONNECTED STRATEGIES: WHY
SUCCESS IS ELUSIVE IN STABILITY
OPERATIONS AND POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION**

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ABSTRACT

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Since the late 1980's, the United States (US) has conducted an increasing number of operations other than war to include attempts at post-conflict reconstruction. Success in these operations has been elusive. The US interventions in Panama, 1989-1991, Somalia, 1992-1994, and Haiti, 1994-1996, provide excellent case studies for determining the foundational causes of its poor performance.

An analysis of these operations yields a consistent lesson. The US Government must develop the capacity to meld national and operational level strategies in a manner that creates unified effort. Without such a capability it will continue to fail to achieve its strategic objectives in such operations. In Panama, Somalia, and Haiti, this lack of capacity resulted in poorly developed and articulated objectives; a lack of unified effort; and an incongruence among ends, ways, and means.

Efforts to improve the Government's capacity to successfully plan and conduct these operations have not resulted in any significant change. Given that the US will continue to face these challenges, it is time to provide legislative solutions that create the structures and processes required to succeed in stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	III
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	VII
DISCONNECTED STRATEGIES: WHY SUCCESS IS ELUSIVE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION	1
STRATEGIC SETTING	1
JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY: PANAMA 1989-1991	2
PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE/CONTINUE HOPE: SOMALIA 1992-1995	5
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: HAITI 1994-1996	9
COMMON DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS OR FAILURE	11
REASONS BEHIND THE CAUSES	12
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE PROCESS	13
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS	14
SUMMARY	15
ENDNOTES	17
BIBLIOGRAPHY	21

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. UN AND US COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR UNOSOM II	7
FIGURE 2. COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY	10

DISCONNECTED STRATEGIES: WHY SUCCESS IS ELUSIVE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

“While we have historically focused on war fighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations-other than war.”¹

—GEN John M. Shaliskashvili
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

STRATEGIC SETTING

Operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Afghanistan, East Timor, Africa, Iraq and others between 1989 and 2004 bear out General Shalikashvili's belief in the changing focus of the United States (US) military. The military has not adapted to this change easily. Commanders and planners of most contemporary operations profess the sentiment that they are comfortable planning and executing combat operations but find operations other than war complex and frustrating. The cause of this discomfort is the fact that the national security community did not begin to think seriously about and train to conduct these operations at any level within the US Government until it became clear in the mid-1990's that US power would be employed most frequently in operations other than war. The absence of necessary national security structures and processes contributed to uneven results in our attempts to solve the complex problems associated with operations other than war. An analysis of three of these operations yields a consistent lesson. The US Government must develop a process that effectively melds national and operational level strategies in a manner that creates unified effort. Without such a process we will not have the capability to achieve our strategic objectives in operations other than war.

The world strategic situation became more complex with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The economic and political influence exerted by the US and the USSR on their allies and clients contained most conflict. The absence of this influence created conditions that fueled both intra-state and inter-state conflict. US national security professionals, who had focused their intellectual effort on containing the USSR, began to resurrect and develop a body of knowledge to enhance US effectiveness in operations other than war. Lieutenant General (LTG) Paul Gorman published the foundational article in 1984 titled “Low Intensity Conflict: Not Fulda, Not Kola.” LTG Gorman argued that the US must have a strategy and a force capable of dealing with non-conventional threats.² In 1986 General John Galvin challenged military thinkers to develop a new paradigm to adapt to what he termed “uncomfortable wars.”³ This effort expanded with the experience and knowledge gained from increasingly frequent operational

deployments. By 1995 the US military had developed Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War." JP 3-07 outlined six principles for operations other than war: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.⁴ The Army's Field Manual (FM) 3-07, published in 2003, included eight more: impartiality, civil-military operations, restraint, transparency, flexibility, credibility, freedom of movement, and consent.⁵

The need to adhere to these principles was a result of four unique requirements of operations other than war identified by experience: the need to gain the support and acceptance of the supported people; a narrower gap between strategic and tactical considerations, concepts, and consequences; the complexity and holistic nature of the situations; and the need for unified application of all elements of national power in order to succeed. General Galvin argued that it is necessary to have a defined structure and process, on which the various contributors are trained, in order to achieve long-term strategic success.⁶ Unfortunately, such an effective structure and process does not exist.

The focus of this paper is stability and reconstruction operations. Its purpose is to identify the reasons that we are unable to successfully conduct them, discuss the most significant efforts to improve our capacity to do so and why they have fallen short, and finally, describe the necessary solutions to apply the elements of national power in a manner that achieves US strategic objectives.

The US interventions in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti provide ideal case studies and are the basis of the analysis. This analysis will show that there are three common elements at the heart of US failures; poorly developed and articulated objectives, lack of unity of effort, and an incongruence among ends, ways, and means. It will also show that these deficiencies exist because there is no structure in place to ensure unified effort in such complex operations and because key leaders change at critical junctures in the unfolding of crises.

JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY: PANAMA 1989-1991

The US executed *Operation Just Cause* after more than two years of increasingly strained relations between the US and Panama. The US lost patience with General Manuel Noriega's corrupt and repressive leadership and indicted him for narco-trafficking in 1988.⁷ When he violently nullified the results of legitimate Panamanian elections in May 1989 efforts began in earnest to oust him.⁸ Confrontations between US military forces and their family members, and Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) increased. During the night of December 16-17, 1989 the PDF killed a US Marine officer at a roadblock and assaulted a naval officer and his wife.⁹ On December 20, in response to this event and other provocations, US forces invaded Panama.¹⁰

The US objectives were to protect US citizens, capture Noriega and bring him to justice, ensure the viability of the Panama Canal and the free exercise of Canal Treaty rights, and restore democracy.¹¹ To varying degrees the US ultimately achieved each of these objectives. However, a number of flaws in the US strategy became apparent in the aftermath of the invasion and in the pace of Panama's recovery. Looting, which cost Panama between one and two billion US dollars, began the morning of the invasion and lasted for four days.¹² The Organization of American States and much of the international community condemned the invasion, questioned President Endara's legitimacy as the new president, and provided no support for Panama's recovery.¹³ The prolonged absence of a legitimate security force and judiciary system hindered the restoration of the rule of law. In December 1990, former members of the PDF attempted a coup that US forces defeated, further undermining the legitimacy of the Endara government.¹⁴ By January 1991, the Panamanian people had become increasingly disenchanted with the Endara Government and began to believe that the US had deceived them.¹⁵ These and a number of other obstacles significantly hindered Panama's recovery.

One of the primary causes of these problems was the fact that President Bush and his advisors' failed to rigorously evaluate and clearly articulate the operation's strategic objectives, especially the objective "restore democracy." Panama had no real democratic tradition from which to develop democratic institutional and societal structures.¹⁶ The Panamanian government could more accurately have been described as praetorian with the civilian population subordinated to the will of the PDF.¹⁷ When General Noriega, who had been the PDF G-2 under President Torrijos, came to power in 1983 he gained complete control of the PDF and ensured that the PDF gained and retained control of Panama.¹⁸ Using the phrase "restore democracy" understated the requirement and as a result the US employed inadequate concepts and resources to emplace a democratic government, arguably the most important strategic objective.

The President did not articulate his vision of Panamanian "democracy." This led commanders and responsible US Government agencies to define the end state themselves. The State Department, for example, viewed democracy as a Panamanian responsibility.¹⁹ It assumed that once the elected President had been sworn in, democracy was in place. Those most familiar with Panama understood that Panama would require assistance and time to develop a democracy. Dr. John Fishel, a senior planner for post-conflict reconstruction in Panama, argued that a better objective would have been "democratic legitimacy," consisting of popular support, an acceptable level of corruption, and the ability to govern.²⁰ Even this minimal

articulation would have provided a greater degree of clarity for operational planners. The lack of a clear end state prevented the development of a sound strategy.

A lack of unified effort also hindered the post-conflict restoration process. This disunity was most apparent in the effects of the decision to compartmentalize the planning process for combat and post-conflict reconstruction in two separate directorates. General Thurman tasked the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) J3 to plan what became *Just Cause* and the J5 to plan post-conflict reconstruction, which became *Promote Liberty*.²¹ General Thurman acknowledged that he had spent all of his effort on *Just Cause* and no more than five minutes reviewing or revising *Promote Liberty*.²² When General Thurman changed the concept for the initial assault he did not account for the effect that the change would have on *Promote Liberty*. The original plan called for the gradual build-up of forces inside of Panama City. This was designed to intimidate the PDF and to deter looting and disorder.²³ Panamanian looters took advantage of the absence of forces and significantly damaged the economy. The looting and disorder also created a perception of US ineffectiveness.

The decision to compartmentalize planning also led to the lack of involvement of other critical government agencies in both the planning and the execution of *Promote Liberty*.²⁴ The US Ambassador to Panama complained that the reason the State Department was unprepared to do its share was that it was not aware of the probability of military action.²⁵ The Department of Justice did not become fully involved in assisting with the development of a new police force and did not even have a permanent staff in Panama until six months after *Just Cause*.²⁶ The absence of interagency involvement necessitated SOUTHCOM to form an ad hoc organization for the coordination of post-conflict reconstruction called the Military Support Group (MSG). The MSG was led by a Colonel, staffed primarily by rotating reservists, and filled to only fifty percent of its required strength.²⁷ Even with these shortcomings it performed extremely well. The dearth of national level resources, however, prevented a much more effective and rapid recovery.²⁸

In addition to problematic objectives and a lack of unified effort, there were disconnects among the ends, ways, and means within the Panama strategy. A damaging flaw was the lack of a detailed strategic level concept for post-hostility operations.²⁹ This was apparent in the absence of feasible plans to build a legitimate police force and judicial system, rehabilitate the country's infrastructure, provide economic assistance, rebuild the country team, and hold elections. Two years after *Just Cause* the US Ambassador remained dissatisfied with the staffing of the US Embassy.³⁰ By early 1991, the US Congress had provided only 100 million US dollars of the one billion promised by President Bush.³¹ The Panamanian judiciary began to

function only because the US Army South (USARSO) Commander provided his legal staff to advise and assist in restoring a credible legal system.³² The lack of an integrated strategy had three significant consequences; insufficient resources, growing disenchantment with the Endara government and US presence, and a slow national recovery. President Endara stated that the “US did not have a specific plan for helping us in establishing democracy.”³³ He was correct.

There are a number of reasons the US strategy was flawed. The change of presidential administrations caused the US to ignore Panama until Noriega nullified the May 1989 elections. This event caused the Bush administration to adopt a harder line toward Noriega. Secretary of Defense Cheney replaced General Woerner with General Thurman in August 1989 because he believed Thurman was more aggressive and a better fit.³⁴ General Thurman quickly ordered the revision of the plan that SOUTHCOM had developed over the previous eighteen months and established the 18th Airborne Corps as the planning and executing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The rapid change in leaders, organizations, and plans diminished the importance and visibility of the analysis of the previous eighteen months that led to a number of conceptual flaws.

A second reason for the incomplete strategy was the lack of an interagency and strategic level planning process.³⁵ A member of the DOD/SOLIC staff commented that he attended only two interagency meetings and these did not occur until January 1990.³⁶ Only the theater and operational level planners at SOUTHCOM and the 18th Airborne Corps developed detailed plans. The Departments of State and Justice would eventually be key players in Panama’s reconstruction but were left out of the planning process. The application of informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, and economic resources was insufficient and significantly delayed Panama’s recovery.

PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE/CONTINUE HOPE: SOMALIA 1992-1995

In April of 1992 the UN responded to a humanitarian disaster in Somalia with an international infusion of food and medical support. The UN was unable to effectively deliver relief because Somali militias looted relief supplies from the relief organizations before they could be delivered to the starving. The UN Secretary General (UNSG) asked President Bush to assist and the US responded with a military airlift of relief supplies out of Kenya into stricken areas throughout Somalia.³⁷ The Somali warlords continued to loot the relief supplies and in December 1992 President Bush authorized *Operation Restore Hope*, a US led United Task Force (UNITAF) tasked to ensure the security and delivery of aid to those in need.³⁸

Restore Hope achieved rapid success and by May 1993, newly inaugurated President Clinton was ready to turn the operation back over to the UN. United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) replaced UNITAF and sought to implement an ambitious mandate that included the reconstruction of Somalia, but with significantly less capability.³⁹ The Somali militias responded to the decreased UN capability and the increased threat to their power by going on the offensive. Throughout the summer of 1993 UN casualties mounted and the US deployed a special operations task force (TF Ranger) to capture warlord Mohammed Aideed, whom the UN determined was responsible for the ambush and deaths of twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers. In October 1993, eighteen members of this task force died in a raid to capture several of Aideed's lieutenants. Confronted with mounting US casualties and questions about the efficacy of the mission, President Clinton announced that US forces would depart by March 1994. Other national contingents soon followed the US lead and by March 1995 all UN forces had redeployed.⁴⁰

The operation did help stem the famine of 1992 but failed to rebuild the nation of Somalia. The only significant difference in the conditions that existed upon the arrival of US forces in 1992 and those that existed upon their departure was a decrease in the magnitude of starvation and death among the Somali people. No political structure was created and clan violence soon escalated to fill the void left by the UN force.⁴¹ By 2004, Somalia still lacked an effective central authority and a wave of Arabization and Islamic fundamentalism had created repression and fertile ground for recruiting and training terrorists.⁴²

The US and UN's failure to resolve the Somalia crisis resulted from constantly shifting and ill-considered objectives, a lack of unity between humanitarian and military operations, and a number of shortcomings in the ways and means applied to the problem. Somalia is the epitome of the term "mission creep." The Somalia operation progressed from a relief effort to an effort to restore stability and order. It expanded again to demobilization, disarmament, and nation-building and finally became a hunt for Aideed. The expanding objectives outstripped the will of many of the nations that provided contingents. When UNOSOM II ordered a mission a contingent commander believed was beyond his national mandate, he would call back to his Capital for permission. If his national leaders denied permission, he would refuse to participate.⁴³

A more serious problem with the objectives was the lack of a common vision between President Bush and the UN Secretary General (UNSG). UNSCR 794 was a Chapter VII, peace enforcement mandate. The UNSG wanted the UNITAF to disarm the Somali militias before the UN reassumed control of the operation. President Bush had agreed only to assist with ensuring

the delivery of relief supplies and Central Command's (CENTCOM) mission statement for that phase of the operation was limited to providing security, open and free passage of relief supplies, and assistance to the UN and relief organizations in providing humanitarian aid.⁴⁴ This was well short of the UN mandate and without US support the mandate was not achievable.

The principle of unity of effort was violated in a number of ways to include the disconnection of security and relief operations and the establishment of a dual chain of command. That operations to provide a secure environment and humanitarian assistance were not unified was a major error. The relief effort was the primary purpose of the mission and depended almost entirely upon the success of the security mission. UN and private relief organizations were present in Somalia but UNITAF did not choose to coordinate with them prior to its arrival. Relief organizations were unaware of the details of the UNITAF mission and could not plan accordingly.⁴⁵ The UNITAF Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was collocated with the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) but they were not proximate to the UNITAF command post. Operational commanders and staff members did not visit the CMOC/HOC and UNITAF was not easily accessible to the relief organizations. The UNITAF staff viewed the CMOC as a less important organization and it seemed as if the two operations were parallel but not interdependent.⁴⁶

The command and control arrangement of UNOSOM II also created a lack of unity of effort. UNOSOM II maintained a dual chain of command (figure 1) in which CENTCOM controlled TF Ranger; MG Montgomery, the commander of US forces in Somalia, controlled the US Quick Reaction Force (QRF); and LTG Bir of Turkey, the UNOSOM II Commander, controlled all other national contingents and US logistics forces. LTG Bir was not happy with the arrangement and complained about the fact that he did not have control of his QRF.⁴⁷ This structure hindered the UN forces' ability to respond quickly to assist TF Ranger on 3 October.⁴⁸




FIGURE 1. UN AND US COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR UNOSOM II

The lack of unity was compounded by a lack of resources. This was particularly evident with introduction of UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II had a much more complex and difficult mandate with significantly less capability. The size of the US force decreased from 25,000 to 4,000. Seventy-five percent of this smaller force was composed of combat service support units.⁴⁹ The UNITAF command and control structure capably planned and executed operations in nine humanitarian relief sectors and maintained control throughout the country. The UNOSOM II staff was insufficiently resourced with a multi-national ad hoc team that had never operated together.⁵⁰ Somali warlords respected UNITAF's strength and when a visible decline in capability became apparent, the militia went on the offensive.

Another notable absence in the Somalia strategy was the lack a comprehensive humanitarian plan. Members of the relief community commented that they did not sense that there was a "uniting strategy."⁵¹ Andrew Natsios, the President's Emergency Coordinator for Somalia, called for a comprehensive strategy that addressed humanitarian efforts and political rehabilitation. He believed that Somalis needed more than an infusion of food, yet, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Department of Defense (DOD) defined the problem as a shortage of food. Because of this minimal definition the successful delivery of food became the focus of the relief effort while development tasks were left to the relief organizations.⁵²

There were several apparent reasons for the problematic objectives, lack of unity of effort, and disconnects between the ends, ways, and means. The difference between President Bush and the UNSG's vision for the Somalia operation was never resolved. He was at the end of his term and conceded to the UNSG's desire for a more ambitious mandate but did not commit to providing the required resources.⁵³ DOD planned in accordance with the President's guidance and adopted his vision, yet the UN mandate remained unchanged. This unresolved dichotomy created a significant divergence between the US and the UN.⁵⁴

The transition of presidential administrations also contributed to the problems. President Clinton inherited the operation but at the time was focused on his transition into office. He supported the UNSG's multilateral approach to solving complex world problems yet also shared President Bush's desire to minimize the US force contribution. As the level of conflict increased, President Clinton was forced to make adjustments to a strategy that he did not have a role in designing.

The lack of a comprehensive concept for humanitarian relief and political reconstruction was a result of a strategy formulation process that failed to integrate the efforts of the UN, relief organizations, and the US interagency. Such a process would have provided a more rigorous

analysis of the situation and developed more appropriate objectives and concepts. It would also have provided greater unity to the humanitarian relief and security operations.

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: HAITI 1994-1996

In September 1994 a UN sanctioned, US military force entered Haiti in order to restore the democratically elected government of Jean Bertrand Aristide. A delegation led by former President Jimmy Carter successfully negotiated the departure of Haitian strongman, LTG Raoul Cedras, and the installation of President Aristide whom Cedras had overthrown in 1992 after his election.⁵⁵ This enabled US forces to conduct a permissive entry into Haiti and averted significant casualties on both sides.

Operation Uphold Democracy had five aims; the departure of Cedras and his supporters, the return to power of the democratically elected government, stopping the flow of Haitian migrants to US shores, a halt to the repression and terrorism employed by Haitian security forces against its populace, and the transition to a UN force that would allow the Haitian Government, the UN, and relief organizations to rebuild the country and alleviate the deplorable living conditions.⁵⁶

In terms of these objectives, Uphold Democracy succeeded. President Aristide peacefully turned power over to another elected president in 1996, Haitian migrant flow to the US slowed significantly, the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) assumed control in March 1995, and enough stability was restored to enable relief agencies to address the humanitarian tasks.⁵⁷ President Aristide was reelected in 2000 but in February 2004 violent demonstrations and rebel attacks led to his ouster. The US again deployed Marines to Haiti to restore order.

The operation's objectives were straightforward and clearly articulated. Criteria for the exit of US forces and turnover to the UN were established and ultimately met when the UNMIH assumed control in March 1995.⁵⁸ The US Atlantic Command's (USACOM) planning for Haiti started in October 1993.⁵⁹ This allowed planners and senior political and military leaders to collaborate and refine the strategic and operational level plans. The collaborative effort enabled operational and tactical planners to develop sound concepts in support of the stated objectives. The Clinton Administration was determined not to repeat the "mission creep" debacle of the previous fall in Somalia.

Because of the desire to not repeat Somalia, the US limited its objectives. The US defined success as turning the mission over to the UN, holding legitimate elections, and training a police force.⁶⁰ These objectives did not address the basis of Haiti's problems, an extreme lack of economic and political development. The failure to address these foundational problems

Planning for Haiti was unique in that two headquarters developed two different plans. When it became apparent that a permissive entry into Haiti was possible, USACOM directed the 10th Mountain Division to assume responsibility for planning and executing this option. The 18th Airborne Corps continued refining the forced entry option. The parallel planning process enabled the flexibility that was required to shift from a forced to a permissive entry after the forced entry force was airborne.⁶¹

The organizational chart shows the following structure:

- US EMBASSY/ INTERAGENCY TF**
 - GOH**
- USACOM**
 - JTF 190 10XX**
 - CTF 181 ARFOR**
 - IPSF**
 - CTF 185 NAVFOR**
 - CTF 185.3 SPMAGTF RESV**
 - CTF 186 AFFOR**
 - 1BCT/10XX**
 - 2BCT/10XX**
 - CARICOM**
 - CJTf 180 18XX**
 - JFACC**
 - CJTf 188 JSOTF**
 - CJTf 180-1 JPOTF**
 - EFF 25 OCT** (Effort/End Date)
 - TF 181**
- SUPPORTING CINCSAGENCIES**
 - *****
 -
 -
 -

Conceptual flaws did exist but were mitigated by the lack of hostile action in the first several days of the operation. There was a lack of congruence in the operational view held by

LTG Hugh Shelton and that held by MG David Meade. LTG Shelton expected the 10th Mountain Division to immediately expand its influence throughout Port au Prince and make its presence felt. The 10th Mountain Division had recently returned from Somalia and was more inclined to view force protection as a higher priority than visibility. Over time, LTG Shelton's prompting and the unfolding of the operation brought the 10th Mountain Division out into the streets.⁶⁴ An interesting contrast existed with the division's 2nd brigade in Cap Haitien and the 3rd Special Forces Group in the countryside. Both units immediately began to engage the populace and were much more successful in obtaining the necessary intelligence to identify former Haitian security force members who were inclined to resist as well as the locations of their weapons caches.⁶⁵

A more significant conceptual flaw existed in the plan to develop a legitimate Haitian police force. Neither of the OPLANs envisioned a complete lack of police presence. However, once the FAd'H was gone, the police force vanished as well. The initial plan was to build a 3000 man police force comprised primarily of members of the FAd'H. By February 1996 a 7000 man police force was to have been in place that was fully trained and possessed an ethic of service to the Haitian people. The ability to train such a force did not exist and the potential to imbue such an ethic in such a corrupt culture was limited.⁶⁶

There were marked improvements in the objectives, unified effort, and congruence of ends, ways and means for the Haiti operation in comparison to Panama and Somalia. This can be attributed to a number of factors. The time available for planning assisted in clarifying objectives and developing detailed concepts, to include an interagency civil-military plan. The integration into the planning process of interagency representatives allowed them to develop plans and anticipate requirements, things they had been unable to do in previous operations. The capability of the Clinton Administration had matured and it incorporated the lessons Somalia operation taught it. As a result, a more mature strategy formulation process emerged.

The problems with incomplete coordination and planning are indicative of the fact that processes to enhance interagency inclusion were new. The objectives did not address the underlying causes of Haiti's problems because of a US aversion to nation-building tasks and the US military's desire to ensure a clear and attainable exit strategy.

COMMON DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS OR FAILURE

Panama, Somalia, and Haiti provide excellent case studies of stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction. They offer useful insights into why success is elusive and yield three common determinants of success or failure. They are the rigor involved in developing and

articulating objectives, the degree of unity of effort, and the congruence among ends, ways, and means.

In Panama, restore democracy was a poorly considered and articulated objective. As a result, the resources, planning, and commitment were not adequate to establish democratic governance and institutions. In Somalia, President Bush's initial objective to provide relief was attainable and well understood but it did not address the source of Somalia's problems. President Clinton acknowledged the need for political and economic reconstruction but did not consider the consequences of attempting to take power from the warlords. The implementation of UNSCR 837 caused the conflict to spiral. The Haiti operation's objectives were attainable and clearly understood, but were insufficient to mandate the needed resources to create long-term stability. In each case, the operations' objectives were a source of failure.

A lack of unified effort hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of each of the three operations. In both Panama and Somalia the maintenance of security and stability were not integrated with humanitarian relief and nation-building operations. This significantly hindered Panama's recovery and prevented Somalia's. In Haiti the US made great efforts to build a plan that encompassed and integrated both security and humanitarian efforts and they yielded some short-term successes.

A third cause of failure was a lack of congruence between ends, ways, and means. In both Panama and Somalia political and economic development was critical to sustained national recovery. Both operations, however, lacked overarching strategic concepts for reconstruction. In Haiti the UN and the US attempted to match ends, ways, and means and successfully achieved their immediate objectives. As previously discussed, the problem in Haiti was not the absence of a plan for reconstruction, but the short-term focus of the reconstruction objectives.

REASONS BEHIND THE CAUSES

The problematic objectives, lack of unity of effort, and lack of congruence among the ends, ways, and means are the result of two phenomena; the lack of a strategic planning and execution process and changes in key leaders at critical junctures. The success of stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction efforts is dependent upon the integrated application of all of the elements of national power. Integrating each element depends upon the willingness and ability of specific US Government agencies to participate in the planning and execution process and in the existence of some organization to unify this effort. Such an effective organization and process does not exist and integration is not the norm. Effective interagency

participation also requires experience, doctrine, and resources that are not yet resident within the applicable agencies.

Changes in presidential administrations, from Reagan to Bush during the Panama crisis and Bush to Clinton during Somalia, caused significant disconnects because of the differing visions of each administration and because of their inexperience and lack of familiarity with the situations. The fact that the Clinton Administration was not new when the Haiti operation began contributed to some of its successes. Changing Combatant Commanders during the Panama crisis and JTF Commanders during the Haiti operation also diminished those operations' effectiveness, again because of the Commanders' differing operational visions.

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE PROCESS

A tremendous body of knowledge existed prior to the 1990's regarding what had been known as low intensity conflict. Since the emergence of operations other than war as an important operational concept, the US military has made significant efforts to improve its ability to conduct stability operations. The national security community and the Bush Administration are also working to enhance national level capacities. Yet, the US's ongoing experience in Iraq indicates that it is still well short of the objective.

Joint Publications 3-07, "*Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*," 3-07.1, "*Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Interagency Operations*," 3-07.3, "*Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*," and 3-08 "*Foreign Internal Defense*," provide guidance to achieve unified effort vertically at the strategic and operational levels and horizontally among organizations involved in complex contingencies. They are not sufficient to unify effort because they are not directive, nor are they authoritative for the interagency. They simply define roles, relationships, and processes.

In 1996 President Clinton recognized the need to develop an interagency planning and execution process. The NSC developed PDD 56, "*Managing Complex Contingency Operations*," published in May 1997. The intent of this PDD was to "institutionalize what we have learned from our recent experiences and to continue the process of improving the planning and management of complex contingency operations."⁶⁷ PDD 56 provided the vision, structure and processes that were lacking in joint doctrine. When President Bush assumed office his NSC published NSPD 1. It superseded PDD 56 though it did not provide the same degree of fidelity.⁶⁸ NSPD-XX, intended to provide that detail, has been awaiting signature and implementation for over two years.⁶⁹

As a result of a CSIS report titled “Play to Win” by the Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, the “Winning the Peace Act” was developed as a legislative attempt to provide lawful direction to “improve America’s capacity to address post-conflict reconstruction.”⁷⁰ This legislation did not reach the Senate or House floors for a vote but there is a consensus in the US Congress that something must be done. Senator Richard Lugar introduced a similar bill in early 2004 that may reach a vote.⁷¹

JFCOM began the development of and experimentation with a concept known as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The purpose of the JIACG is to provide interagency expertise within the combatant command that is also capable of reaching back to their agencies and to the NSC for guidance and resources.⁷² This concept shows promise and is already present at several regional combatant commands. The problem exists with the support the agencies are able and willing to commit to the JIACG.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The US Government should undertake a comprehensive initiative to develop a directive process that will unify the effort of every echelon and organization involved in the policy, planning, coordination, and execution of stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction.

The US Congress should adopt legislation similar to the Winning the Peace Act. As a minimum this legislation should provide provisions similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 focused upon improving interagency capability to act in concert. Service in the interagency arena should be rewarded much as joint service in the military is rewarded. This act should allocate sufficient money to fund exercise and planning branches within each agency as well as personnel support for each regional combatant command’s JIACG. The act should increase the number of internships, educational opportunities, and exchanges within and among government agencies, as this is an effective means of overcoming agency biases.

The most important provision of this act should be direction that an exercise program be conducted that involves the NSC, strategic and operational level commands, the interagency, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations. Such an exercise program would enable key individuals to develop relationships before the execution of a contingency, create a large body of stakeholders among the participants, and identify flaws and gaps in the processes and doctrine.

Government organizations, “think tanks,” and academic institutions committed to the effort to improve our effectiveness in stability and reconstruction operations should be supported and should also be involved in collaborative efforts. Private organizations also play an important

role, bring independent insight into the debate, and should be a part of the effort. Adopting these recommendations will give the US government the capability to develop a national level strategy that unifies the elements of national power and to more effectively conduct stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction.

SUMMARY

By early 2004 the US had experienced over 550 US soldier deaths in Iraq. No one can persuasively argue that the interagency was involved in developing the plans for post Operation Iraqi Freedom. The US has been aware of a significant shortfall in its capacity to execute stability and reconstruction operations for well over a decade and it has made a number of unsuccessful attempts to address the problem. Without legislative direction and sufficient resources within the interagency, the US will not be capable of developing a process that will yield unified effort among all involved organizations. Without such a process it will continue to develop and execute disconnected strategies that fall well short of achieving its strategic objectives.

WORD COUNT= 5,960

ENDNOTES

¹ John M. Shaliskashvili, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), Foreword.

² LTG Paul Gorman, "Low Intensity Conflict: Not Fulda, Not Kola," in *Low Intensity Conflict: Selected Readings*, Field Circular 100-39, ed. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Ft Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 1984), 58-60.

³ General John R. Galvin, "Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm," in *Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict*, ed. Max G. Manwaring, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 9-10.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), II-2.

⁵ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 20 February 2003), 4-13 – 4-19.

⁶ Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, eds., *Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 6.

⁷ John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing The Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 2.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 156-158.

¹⁰ Ibid., 164.

¹¹ Fishel, 4.

¹² Richard H. Shultz, Jr., *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-building in Panama Following Just Cause* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 28.

¹³ Richard L. Millett, "The Aftermath of Intervention: Panama 1990," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 32, no. 1 (Spring 1990), 4.

¹⁴ Andres Oppenheimer, "Panama's Troubled Resuscitation as a Nation-State," in *Conflict Resolution and Democratization in Panama; Implications for US Policy*, ed. Eva Loser (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), 47-48.

¹⁵ Eusebio Mujal-Leon and Christopher Bruneau, "Foreign Assistance and Reconstruction Efforts," in *Conflict Resolution and Democratization in Panama; Implications for US Policy*, ed. Eva Loser (Washington, D.C.: the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), 60-61.

¹⁶ Fishel, 55.

¹⁷ Shultz, 5-7.

¹⁸ Ibid., 9.

¹⁹ Fishel, 55.

²⁰ Ibid., 56.

²¹ Shultz, 16.

²² Ibid.

²³ Fishel, 25-26.

²⁴ Schultz, 39-40.

²⁵ Schultz, 63.

²⁶ Fishel, 49-51.

²⁷ Schultz, 35.

²⁸ Ibid., 55.

²⁹ Ibid., 17.

³⁰ Ibid., 63-64

³¹ Ibid., 55.

³² Fishel, 37.

³³ Fishel, 57.

³⁴ Woodward, 92-93.

³⁵ Schultz, p. 17.

³⁶ Schultz, p. 39.

³⁷ Doctrine Committee of the Royal Netherlands Army, *Peace Operations: Army Doctrine Publication III* (The Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Army, 1999), 25.

³⁸ Daniel P. Bolger, *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990's* (Navato, CA: Presidio, 1995), 284-285.

³⁹ Ibid., 295-296.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 327.

⁴¹ Center of Military History, *United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2003), 14.

⁴² Gina El Koury, *Black Hawk Down No More* (Public International Law & Policy Group, April 2002), 2-3.

⁴³ Center of Military History, 28.

⁴⁴ Bolger, 284-285.

⁴⁵ Seiple, 109-110.

⁴⁶ Seiple, pp.116-119. Seiple provides a detailed description of the relationship between the UNITAF Headquarters and the CMOC as well as the attitudes held by operations staff regarding the CMOC staff.

⁴⁷ Bolger, 297.

⁴⁸ Center of Military History, 31.

⁴⁹ Bolger, 297.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 296-297.

⁵¹ Seiple, 127.

⁵² Ibid., 104-105.

⁵³ Bolger, 284.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Adam B. Siegel, *The Intervention of Haiti* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1996), 18.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 1.

⁵⁷ Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Bauman, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervention": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), ix.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 145-146.

⁵⁹ Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti – A Case Study* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 19.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 25.

⁶¹ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 58.

⁶² Hayes and Wheatley, 20, 33-35.

⁶³ Ibid., 35-36.

⁶⁴ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 108.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 191-192.

⁶⁶ Hayes and Wheatley, 45.

⁶⁷ U. S. President, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, May 1997, class handout for Peace Operations Policy and Practice, U.S. Army War College, AY2004.

⁶⁸ Center for Strategic and International Studies: The Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, "Play to Win; Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-conflict Reconstruction," January 2003, Available from <http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/playtowin.pdf>; Internet; accessed 11 January 2004.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction Bill Introduced: Senate Legislation Would Set Up Permanent Mechanism to Help Win the Peace," Press Release, June 11, 2003. Available from http://www.csis.org/press/pr03_39.htm; Internet; accessed 17 March 2004.

⁷¹ Office of Senator Richard Lugar, "Lugar introduces post-conflict readiness initiative," Press Release, February 26, 2004. Available from <http://lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=218427>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2004.

⁷² Joint Forces Command, "A Concept for Improving U.S. Interagency Operational Planning and Coordination," (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Command, 4 March 2002), 10.

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